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COMMENTS
many life insurance and joint bank account cases to the contrary,9
and in fact, ignored the whole doctrine of donee beneficiaries.' 0
Judges Steinert and Robinson recognized the case as involving a
donee beneficiary and joined in a well-written dissent which concludes:
"The result of the majority opinion will be that what heretofore has
been thought to be an attractive form of government security will
prove but a snare to those who rely upon it." The rule of the case
will do more than defeat the purpose of those who purchase this type
of bond. It strikes at every life insurance policy which contains the
now usual clauses reserving to the insured the power to effect a change
of beneficiary or realize the cash value of the policy, without consent
of the named beneficiary.
WARREN L. SHATTUCK.
EXEMPTIONS OF REMAINDER INTERESTS IN THE INHERI-
TANCE TAX STATUTE OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
Three recent cases involving the application of the inheritance tax
statute of the State of Washington have raised some problems which
should receive immediate attention.' The statute provides three differ-
ent schedules of rates, the schedule applicable to any gift being deter-
mined by the relationship of the beneficiary to the deceased.' Class A
includes any devise, bequest, legacy, gift or beneficial interest to any
property or income therefrom which shall pass to or for the use or bene-
fit of any grandfather, grandmother, father, mother, husband, wife,
child or stepchild, or any lineal descendant of the deceased. The sched-
ule of rates for class A provides for a tax of 1 per cent on amounts
from $10,000 to $25,000; of 2 per cent on amounts from $25,000 to
$50,000, and of higher rates for larger amounts. Class B includes gifts
to a brother or sister. The schedule of rates for class B begins with a
tax of 3 per cent on amounts from $1,000 to $5,000, 4 per cent on
amounts from $5,000 to $10,000, and continues at an increasing rate
for larger amounts. Class C includes gifts to all others. The schedule
of rates for class C begins with a tax of 10 per cent on all amounts
up to $10,000, 15 per cent on amounts from $10,000 to $25,000, and
continues at an increasing rate for larger amounts. The classification
set up by the statute is inclusive in that it covers all possible gifts to
all persons. The statute provides for appraisement of property subject
'VANCE, op. cit. supra note 3; 1 BOGERT and 5 MIcHIE, op. cit. supra note 8.
'"The Washington court made no mention of the possibility that the
transaction before it might be controlled by the Statute of Wills and In
re Murphy's Estate, 193 Wash. 400, 75 P. (2d) 916 (1938), rehearing denied,
195 Wash. 695, 81 P. (2d) 779 (1938). Several unsuccessful attempts have
been made to induce application of that statute to life insurance contracts
in which the beneficiary's interest was not absolute. Martin v. Modern
Woodmen, 253 111L 400, 97 N. E. 693 (1912); Johnston v. Scott, 76 Misc. Rep.
641, 137 N. Y. S. 243 (Sup. Ct. 1912). It would appear equally inapplicable
to the contract in issue in Decker v. Fowler, 99 Wash. Dec. 485, 92 P. (2d)
254 (1939).1In re Gochnour's Estate, 192 Wash. 92, 72 P. (2d) 1027 (1937); In re
Hallstrom's Estate, 98 Wash. Dec. 193, 88 P. (2d) 405 (1939); In re Bostad's
Estate, 100 Wash. Dec. 25, 93 P. (2d) 726 (1939).
2Rmw. REv. STAT. (Supp. 1939) § 11202.
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to the tax3 and particularly for the manner of determining the value
of gifts of life estates, estates for a term of years, and remainders.
4
The first of this series of cases under discussion was In re Gochnour's
Estate.' The facts are, shortly, that an estate valued at $9,369 was
devised to a class A beneficiary for life, remainder to class B and C
beneficiaries. The life tenant was given the power to consume the
corpus of the estate. It was held that no inheritance tax could be
collected although the remainder was valued at $6,315. The next case
was In re Hallstrom's Estate." An estate, valued at $3,350.51, was
devised to a class A beneficiary for life, remainder to class C bene-
ficiaries. The life tenant was not given the power to consume the
corpus of the estate. The court held that no tax could be levied on the
remainder. The result of these decisions was that the state was pre-
cluded from taxing a remainder interest preceded by a life estate to a
class A beneficiary. It seemed that a loophole for evasion of the in-
heritance tax statute was opened.
Immediately after the Hallstrom case, the legislature amended the
statute to withdraw the exemption extended to the remainder interests.
The court had stated that the life tenant would, to the extent of the
amount of the tax claimed on the remainder, be deprived of the "use
and benefit" of the property devised if a tax were allowed. So the
legislature deleted the words "for the use or benefit of"7 from the
statute. It now reads in effect that class A shall include "any gift
or beneficial interest to any property" rather than "any gift or bene-
ficial interest to or for the use and benefit of any property". The dele-
tion was a futile gesture on the part of the legislature. The court in
the latest decision, In re Bolstad's Estate," said that the amendment
does not change the effect of the Gocknour and Hallstrom cases because
the deletion of those words left unchanged the proposition that a life
tenant had a right to any income or beneficial interest devised to him
and that this interest should not be decreased by an inheritance tax.
From the first two cases it was difficult to determine what would
happen if the total value of the assets in the decedent's estate were
in excess of $10,000. The Bolstad case answered the question in an
altogether surprising manner. An estate, valued at $13,311.38 after
all allowable deductions were made, was devised in trust for testatrix's
son, remainder to class C beneficiaries upon the death of the son. Under
the plan for determining the value of life estates and remainders, the
life estate was valued at $8,271.27 and the remainder at $5,040.11.
In a proceeding to determine the amount of inheritance tax due, it was
held that the estate is exempt from taxation up to $10,000 and that
the balance, $3,311.38, is taxable at the rate of 10 per cent. In allow-
ing an exemption of the first $10,000 the court reiterated the proposi-
tion that the income to a class A beneficiary is to be protected against
'REM. REV. STAT. (Supp. 1939) § 11202-1.
'REM. REV. STAT. (Supp. 1939) § 11205.
'192 Wash. 92, 72 P. (2d) 1027 (1937).
698 Wash. Dec. 193, 88 P. (2d) 405 (1939).
'Wash. Laws 1939, c. 202 § 1. For an expression of what effect it was
thought this amendment would have see Laws Relating to Inheritance
Taxes and Escheats (Wash. Tax Commission 1939) p. 7, n. to § 11202, and
p. 15, n. to § 11205.
6100 Wash. Dec. 25, 93 P. (2d) 726 (1939).
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encroachment by a tax on a remainder, but in permitting the 10 per
cent tax on the sum in excess of $10,000 to be paid out of the corpus
of the estate, it permitted just such an encroachment.
The proposition which the court completely brushed aside in all of
these cases was that the statute sets up a plan for determining the
value of life estates and remainders, the statute indicating thereby that
the value of these interests is to be used in determining the amount
which each beneficiary receives and that it is this value which in turn
determines the rate to be applied. In the Bolstad case the corpus of the
estate was divided for tax purpose into two units of $10,000 and $3,311,
arbitrarily, instead of units of value that each class of beneficiaries
receives, namely: $8,271 of value to the class A beneficiary, and $5,040
of value to the class C beneficiary. The only rationale that can explain
this result and bring all of these cases into a semblance of harmony
is that the court views the inheritance tax as a tax upon the transfer
of specific things or objects, and as a result of this view applied to the
statute, there cannot be a tax on the first $10,000 of specific things
whenever a class A beneficiary is to enjoy them, however short may be
the period of that enjoyment. It is submitted that this involves a
wholly unjustifiable interpretation of the statute and has resulted in
exemption, wholly or in part, of gifts in remainder contrary to the
purpose of the statute.
What the court seems to have overlooked in applying the tax is that
the actual property or "things" which belonged to a decedent may be,
divided between different persons upon the basis of time of enjoyment
as well as of allocation between them of actual physical units. When
one creates a life estate and a remainder in specified property worth
$13,311 there are as truly two separate and distinct gifts as in the case
of the physical division of $13,311 worth of property. The proper
construction, therefore, is that the statute imposes a tax upon the
transfer of interests in "things" or property, including of course any
gift of a valuable right to use or enjoy the property of the decedent
for a specified time. If the class A beneficiary had actually received
$8,271, absolutely, and the class C beneficiary had received $5,040,
absolutely, the rate applied would without doubt be 10 per cent to the
$5,040 given to the class C beneficiary. There should be no greater
difficulty applying the same rate to a non-possessory remainder which
is an actual property interest worth $5,040.
The confusion, if any, is to be found in the matter of collection
because of the section which makes the tax a lien on the estate until
paid." It is out of this provision that the objection of the court arises
that the income to the life tenant is reduced if a tax is levied. However,
this properly raises an issue as to when and how the tax is to be
collected, not whether the tax is leviable. Another court has said that
payment out of the estate is not an impairment of the life estate as
such.10 But even if unwilling to accept this viewpoint, the Washing-
ton court had another alternative. Taking into consideration the pro-
visions relating to payment and collection of the tax" and the provision
making the tax a lien on the estate until paid, the court could have
RE=. REv. STAT. (Supp. 1939) § 11205.
1wMinot v. Winthrop, 162 Mass. 113, 38 N. E. 512 (1894).
" RxIm REv. STAT. (Supp. 1939) §§ 11205, 11208, 11209, 11210.
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said that the tax levied with respect to the gift in remainder should
be collected from the remaindermen personally, and if not paid by
them the tax would constitute a lien on the remainder interest only. 2
If the tax were levied on a gift of money, the tax would be taken from
that amount only. Certainly neither of these constructions does the
violence to the statute that the court does in creating by judicial fiat
an exemption wholly foreign to the language of the statute applicable
to class C gifts.
In both the Gochnour and Bolstad cases the life tenant was given
the power to invade the corpus of the estate. This feature is chiefly
important in determining the value of the life estate and the remainder.
However, it is pertinent to the point here discussed because the exist-
ence of such a power seems to bring these cases within the section, which,
ambiguously it is true, provides for holding in abeyance the collection
of the tax on a remainder subject to a contingency until it becomes
possessory.13 If this section were so applied, the court's objection van-
ishes because no tax is payable until after the life tenant dies. Thus,
there was a third alternative available to the court in two of the three
cases.
As unsatisfactory as the results in these cases seem to be, not all
of the criticism should be directed at the court. As those who have
examined the inheritance tax statutes of this state know, they are a
hodge-podge through which one finds his way with greatest difficulty.
Starting in 1901 with a statute which was poorly phrased and more
poorly constructed, it has been amended session after session by random
insertions and deletions. There are no definitions; there seems to be
no order or continuity. Closely related subjects are treated in widely
separated sections; there is a bewildering intermixture of topics in
every section. Ambiguity stalks throughout. Until the statutes are
clarified by complete revision in light of current theories, practices and
problems, we probably should not expect treatment of such a complex
subject matter in a manner which is wholly free of the possibility of
criticism.
EARL K. NANSEN.
"For the idea that a devise of a remainder is subject to execution see
Lockwood v. Nye, 2 Swan 515 (Tenn. 1852), 58 Am. Dec. 77 (1886).
iREm. REV. STAT § 11206. The court held that the remainder was
vested in each case. In the absence of statutory authorization, it is
doubtful that a tax should be levied on a remainder before it comes into
possession where it is preceded by a life estate with a power in the life
tenant to invade the corpus of the estate because the value of the re-
mainder is uncertain. In re Mead's Estate, 145 Misc. Rep. 893, 261 N. Y. S.
328 (1932).
